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ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

28 April 1983

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,
building, Agency/Post)

Initials

Date

1. [Redacted]
Special Assistant to
the DCI

2.

3.

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REMARKS

Joe,

Per your request, attached is an official copy of the data on CIA manpower for the period 1980-1988 by structural category. Please let me know if you require additional information on this subject.

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[Redacted] symbol, Agency/Post)

Room No.—Bldg.

4E06 Hqs.

Phone No.

Deputy Comptroller

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Chrono(IC Staff
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PRODUCTION

CIA's manpower devoted to analysis and production has grown []

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[] In FY 1984, we are requesting a total of []

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people and expect to need [] by FY 1988 in order to sustain our long range plan to strengthen our overall analytic capability. The trend in international events and the changing nature of US interests in an increasingly interdependent world require that CIA not only be able to monitor developments and provide current support on political events worldwide but also be able to provide in-depth information on the ramifications of economic, social, and military developments. In today's world, a financial crisis in a developing country in Africa could have serious implications for American banks and threaten the international financial system as a whole; instability in a Third World country like the Philippines could threaten US security interests directly by denying us access to military facilities. As a result we can no longer be satisfied with a capability merely to monitor situations as they happen but rather we must know countries in depth--their socio-economic situations and their military capabilities--in order to alert policymakers to pending problems and to provide prompt and complete answers when crises occur. This indeed was the stimulus for the DDI reorganization into geographic offices. Many of our personnel additions since that time and for the foreseeable future are intended to provide more balanced coverage on individual countries, in particular adding economists and military specialists to an existing cadre of political analysts. Most of the remainder are needed to improve coverage on complex international issues such as terrorism, finance, and threats to political stability. []

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Third World

-- Our growth in manpower on the Third World is the most obvious but by no means the only example of the above factors at work. In 1980, there were about [] people in the production category working on Third World 25X1 countries with about another [] working on issues affecting the Third 25X1 World; in 1983, we have []. This number will increase by about some [] 25X1 positions in 1984 with plans to total about [] in 1988. The number is 25X1 less important than the type of analysts it represents and the work they will do. In 1980, we had a strong cadre of political analysts providing current policy support; but we had few economists with a full-time country account, and virtually no full-time Third World military analysts. Most of the new people will be economic and military specialists to give us comprehensive coverage and make possible in-depth research on all major Third World countries. We are also adding specialists such as demographers, anthropologists and others to give us the capability to assess social change and causes of instability in the Third World. [] 25X1

Latin America

-- In 1980, the DDI had [] people working on Latin America, including Cuba; 25X1 in 1983, there are [] today; in 1984, we will add [] and anticipate a 25X1 total strength of almost [] by 1988. The growth of insurgency in Centra25X1 America and Cuban and Soviet activities in the Caribbean Basin as a whole have led to markedly increased demands for policy support on countries of the region. In addition, the recent debt crisis in Mexico and potential similar problems in Brazil and Argentina raise doubts about the political stability of these states, leading to a greater research effort across-the-board on the socio-economic as well as political dynamics of these

countries. []

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- The growth in imagery analyst positions is a clear response to the need to study insurgency. DDI had [] imagery analyst working on all Latin America in 1980 (including Cuba); 1983, there are [] of them on Cuba); we will add another position in 1984 and hope to total [] by 1988. []

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Cuba

- The DDI established a [] person center to do multidisciplinary research and analysis on Cuba in 1978. Another [] people did [] research on Cuba. The Cuba effort increased to [] in 1983 in response to growing Cuban involvement in the region and Havana's continued support to Soviet activity elsewhere. We will add [] more positions in 1984 and expect to total [] Cuban analysts by 1988. []

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- The effort on Mexico has grown dramatically in response to financial and political instability there. In 1980, DDI had the equivalent of [] positions devoted to Mexico; in 1983, there are [] positions; this will grow in 1984 to [] and probably stay at that level through 1988. []

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- The Caribbean ministates (excluding Cuba) were of such little interest to the US in 1980 that one DDI analyst watched all of them and still had time to fill in on other tasks. Cuban interference in regional affairs, however, has required increased analytic attention. In 1983, there are [] people working full-time on these same ministates and the effort will increase by [] in 1984. Growth beyond that will depend on developments in the region, but present events suggest that we will devote more rather than less attention to the area. []

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- The revolution in Nicaragua and subsequent Sandinista support to insurgents elsewhere in Central America has increased demands on the DDI for analysis and production as well as for operational support. In 1978,

the DDI had [] analysts assigned to Central America (excluding Mexico). 25X1
 This grew to about [] in 1980 but today we have [] We will add another 25X1
 position in 1984 and at least [] more by 1988 although this could increase 25X1
 if the situation in Central America deteriorates. [] 25X1
 -- On Nicaragua alone, our effort has grown from [] full-time analyst in 1978 25X1
 (with others working part-time as the need arose) to [] people in 1983. In 25X1
 order to improve coverage of military developments and Nicaraguan support
 to insurgencies elsewhere we will add [] imagery analyst in 1984. [] 25X1

Middle East

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 -- The production effort on the Middle East has always been significant with
 virtually all of the DDI functional offices in 1980 devoting resources to
 the effort. In 1980, about [] people worked on the Middle East; by 1983 25X1
 this number had grown to [] and we plan to add another [] in 1984. We 25X1
 anticipate a growth to about [] full-time positions in 1988. Most 25X1
 important the growth represents the addition of full-time country economic
 and military analysts by contrast with 1980 when most such work was
 confined to a few priority areas or as part of broader issues, e.g.,
 OPEC. [] 25X1
 -- Egypt is an example less of dramatic manpower growth than of obtaining
 full-time concentration of analysts from each of the disciplines on a
 single country. In 1980, the DDI had the equivalent of [] people 25X1
 working on Egyptian affairs, but only [] worked only on Egypt full- 25X1
 time. Egypt's growing importance to US policy interests in the Middle
 East and increased concern about its stability mean we must be able to
 answer more complicated questions about its society and people. In 1983,
 there are [] people working full-time only on Egypt--including political, 25X1
 economic, and military specialists--with others working on particular

Egyptian issues as part of broader regional responsibilities. We do not anticipate any significant growth in the Egyptian effort through 1988.



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Africa

-- In 1980, some [] people in the production category worked directly on Africa. In 1983, this has grown to [] and will increase by [] in 1984. We anticipate a total effort of [] by 1988. []

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-- In 1980, the DDI had [] people working full-time on South Africa with several others working occasionally as specific need arose. In 1983, [] people work full-time on South Africa, and we will add [] more in 1984.


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These increases respond to concern about domestic political and social conditions within South Africa and its relations with its neighbors, including the problem of Namibia. []

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International Financial Situation

-- In 1980, there were [] people analyzing international finance and related problems; by 1983, this has grown to an entire branch of [] people. In 1984, we will add [] people to this branch and by 1988 reach a total of [] working full-time on international finance. This growth reflects not only the growing appreciation in the US Government of the importance of international financial developments to our security interests but also the fact that DDI is uniquely capable of providing the kind of analysis needed because of our good relations with a number of US financial institutions. []

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Terrorism-Instability

-- Terrorism is an intelligence problem that has grown both in the number of groups and countries involved and in the impact on US interests. Moreover, it has become clear that it is an analytic problem that extends beyond monitoring terrorist groups to understanding what are the social and economic conditions that lead to terrorism. In 1980, [] analysts in the DDI were responsible for research and analysis of terrorist groups and incidents. In 1983, there are [] people working on all aspects of the terrorist problem. This includes [] people in the Instability and Insurgency Center created in the DDI in 1982 to focus analytic responsibility for terrorism and insurgency. []

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It closely supports 25X1

counterterrorism efforts of other US Government agencies. In addition, one element of the Center concentrates on using the latest in social science methodology and expertise to determine indicators of political instability in our effort to predict future troublespots. By 1984, we will have [] positions devoted to terrorism problems and anticipate about 25X1 [] by 1988. At the same time, the analytic expertise devoted to the topic 25X1 has expanded; for example, [] 25X1

[] 25X1

Soviet Bloc

- Even analysis of the USSR, where CIA has traditionally targeted the largest single portion of its analytic resources, has so increased in complexity that more people with a wide variety of skills are needed. To fully answer questions on capabilities of Soviet weapons systems and future force projections we must analyze such things as economic performance, political decisionmaking, defense planning, and the state of Soviet technology. Furthermore, we must be able to analyze future systems much earlier in the production/design cycle. Consequently, we need a wide range of political, economic, military, and scientific and technical skills. [] 25X1
- The USSR effort as a result has grown from about [] in 1980 [] 25X1 [] 25X1 [] in 1983 [] In 25X1 1984, we are adding [] positions, [] of these to enhance our analytic 25X1 effort on Soviet technology. By 1988, we anticipate a total of [] on the 25X1 USSR [] 25X1
- A significant aspect of our work on the Soviet Bloc since 1980 is the increased attention to the political and economic affairs of East European

countries. Recent events in Poland point up the need to better understand developments in this area, including their impact on Soviet actions and on the actions of our West European allies. In 1980, DDI had about [] people 25X1 working on East Europe (excluding Soviet/Warsaw Pact military forces); in 1983, there are [] (an additional [] follow the Warsaw Pact). In 1984, we 25X1 will have [] (plus [] Warsaw Pact) and anticipate a total of [] by 1988 25X1 (plus [] on Warsaw Pact). Most of the additional analysts will be full- 25X1 time economists for country desks and political-military specialists. Events have shown that we need a better ability to assess the economic viability of East European states and also the potential role of their military forces. [] 25X1

Data Bases

Developing and maintaining data bases is also highly manpower intensive, yet we have learned to our cost that failure to do so has serious consequences when basic information is needed in time of crisis. A case in point is the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) program, which at its height in the late 1960s provided a systematic update of basic data on some 40 major countries every three years, and less frequent updates of the rest of the world. These surveys covered not only political, economic, and social data but also military order of battle, transportation and communications networks, and security services. The NIS was, however, a costly program in money and manpower and as a result it was abandoned in 1973. Since that time, we have done handbooks and geographic surveys on many countries and studied specific sectors in depth but we have no systematic approach to basic intelligence on a worldwide basis. As a result, when crises occur in areas of the world that previously were considered low priority, we virtually have to begin from the ground up. [] 25X1

In important areas of the Soviet economy, we do not have enough analysts to accumulate and assess the basic data needed to maintain our analysis at past levels. Today, for example, we have only analysts covering the Soviet chemicals, metals, and transportation industries. By contrast, in the 1960s we had an entire branch to analyze each of these sectors. If we are to adequately support work on technology transfer, trade sanctions, and analysis of the industrial base supporting the defense industries, however, we need the kinds of data bases on these industries that we had then.

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Data bases for Third World countries present us with both similar and different kinds of problems. In the case of political and social data on the Third World, we need to design, build, and maintain the data bases ourselves and this is highly manpower intensive. In other areas, for example international financial statistics, there has been a proliferation in the number and kind of data bases on the Third World available outside the Agency. To find and evaluate these data bases, feed them into our own computer system, and most important create the kind of software that makes it possible for our analysts to access them relatively easily, requires an investment of manpower as well as money and equipment.

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We also need people to update and maintain our economic models. In some cases we have country econometric models that we do not now use because we do not have enough people and can only operate the models for highest priority countries.

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Production Manpower

<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>
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